# BEFORE THE TENNESSEE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION

IN RE:	Roy E. Williams, Sr.	)
	Dist. 1, Map 4E, Group A, Control Map 6H,	) Anderson County
	Parcel 8.00, S.I. 000	)
	Residential Property	í
	Tax Year 2006	j

### **INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER**

### Statement of the Case

The subject property is presently valued as follows:

LAND VALUE	IMPROVEMENT VALUE	TOTAL VALUE	<b>ASSESSMENT</b>
\$148,000	\$44,900	\$192,900	\$48,225

An appeal has been filed on behalf of the property owner with the State Board of Equalization. The undersigned administrative judge conducted a hearing in this matter on November 15, 2006 in Maryville, Tennessee. In attendance at the hearing were Roy and June Williams, the appellants, and Anderson County Property Assessor Vernon Long.

## FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Subject property consists of a 0.84 acre lot improved with a 1,011 square foot residence constructed in 1942. Subject property is located on Norris Lake at 140 Shore Loop in Andersonville, Tennessee.

The taxpayers contended that subject property should be valued at \$93,740. In support of this position, the taxpayers argued that the 2005 countywide reappraisal caused the value of subject property to increase excessively. In addition, the taxpayers asserted that subject lot experiences a significant loss in value because TVA effectively controls 0.67 of the 0.84 acres as it has the right to flood that portion of subject lot. The taxpayers maintained that subject property should be appraised by reducing the value of subject lot by 67%. This results in a contended land value of \$48,840.

The assessor contended that subject property should remain valued at \$192,900. In support of this position, the property record card was introduced into evidence. In addition, Mr. Long testified concerning the sale of an admittedly superior lot for in excess of \$200,000.

The basis of valuation as stated in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 67-5-601(a) is that "[t]he value of all property shall be ascertained from the evidence of its sound, intrinsic and immediate value, for purposes of sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer without consideration of speculative values . . ."

After having reviewed all the evidence in the case, the administrative judge finds that the subject property should remain valued at \$192,900 based upon the presumption of correctness attaching to the decision of the Anderson County Board of Equalization. As will be discussed below, the administrative judge finds that the taxpayers introduced insufficient evidence to substantiate their contention of value. Accordingly, the administrative judge has no choice except to affirm the current appraisal of subject property despite the lack of sales data from the assessor of property.

Since the taxpayer is appealing from the determination of the Anderson County Board of Equalization, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. See State Board of Equalization Rule 0600-1-.11(1) and *Big Fork Mining Company v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board*, 620 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. App. 1981).

The administrative judge finds that the fair market value of subject property as of January 1, 2006 constitutes the relevant issue. The administrative judge finds that the Assessment Appeals Commission has repeatedly rejected arguments based upon the amount by which an appraisal has increased as a consequence of reappraisal. For example, the Commission rejected such an argument in *E.B. Kissell, Jr.* (Shelby County, Tax Years 1991 and 1992) reasoning in pertinent part as follows:

The rate of increase in the assessment of the subject property since the last reappraisal or even last year may be alarming but is not evidence that the value is wrong. It is conceivable that values may change dramatically for some properties, even over so short of time as a year. . .

The best evidence of the present value of a residential property is generally sales of properties comparable to the subject, comparable in features relevant to value. Perfect comparability is not required, but relevant differences should be explained and accounted for by reasonable adjustments. If evidence of a sale is presented without the required analysis of comparability, it is difficult or impossible for us to use the sale as an indicator of value. . . .

Final Decision and Order at 2. Respectfully, the administrative judge finds that the taxpayers did not introduce any comparable sales in support of their contention of value. The administrative judge finds this puzzling given Mr. Williams' testimony that he was a realtor for many years.

The administrative judge finds that the taxpayers' proposed valuation methodology does not comport with generally accepted appraisal practices. See generally, Appraisal Institute, *The Appraisal of Real Estate* (12<sup>th</sup> ed. 2001). The administrative judge finds that the primary value of subject acreage is the 0.17 acres suitable as a homesite on Norris Lake.

The administrative judge finds merely reciting factors that could cause a dimunition in value does not establish the current appraisal exceeds market value. The administrative

judge finds the Assessment Appeals Commission has ruled on numerous occasions that one must *quantify* the loss in value one contends has not been adequately considered. See, e.g., *Fred & Ann Ruth Honeycutt* (Carter Co., Tax Year 1995) wherein the Assessment Appeals Commission ruled that the taxpayer introduced insufficient evidence to quantify the loss in value from the stigma associated with a gasoline spill. The Commission stated in pertinent part as follows:

The assessor conceded that the gasoline spill affected the value of the property, but he asserted that his valuation already reflects a deduction of 15% for the effects of the spill. . . . The administrative judge rejected Mr. Honeycutt's claim for an additional reduction in the taxable value, noting that he had not produced evidence by which to quantify the effect of the "stigma." The Commission finds itself in the same position. . . . Conceding that the marketability of a property may be affected by contamination of a neighboring property, we must have proof that allows us to quantify the loss in value, such as sales of comparable properties. . . Absent this proof here we must accept as sufficient, the assessor's attempts to reflect environmental condition in the present value of the property.

Final Decision and Order at 1-2. Similarly, in *Kenneth R. and Rebecca L. Adams* (Shelby Co., Tax Year 1998) the Commission ruled in relevant part as follows:

The taxpayer also claimed that the land value set by the assessing authorities. . .was too high. In support of that position, she claimed that. . .the use of surrounding property detracted from the value of their property. . . . As to the assertion the use of properties has a detrimental effect on the value of the subject property, that assertion, without some valid method of quantifying the same, is meaningless.

Final Decision and Order at 2.

#### **ORDER**

It is therefore ORDERED that the following value and assessment be adopted for tax year 2006:

LAND VALUE	IMPROVEMENT VALUE	TOTAL VALUE	<u>ASSESSMENT</u>
\$148,000	\$44,900	\$192,900	\$48,225

It is FURTHER ORDERED that any applicable hearing costs be assessed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501(d) and State Board of Equalization Rule 0600-1-.17.

Pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-301—325, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501, and the Rules of Contested Case Procedure of the State Board of Equalization, the parties are advised of the following remedies:

1. A party may appeal this decision and order to the Assessment Appeals Commission pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501 and Rule 0600-1-.12 of the Contested Case Procedures of the State Board of Equalization.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-1501(c) provides that an appeal "must be filed within thirty (30) days from the date the initial decision is sent." Rule 0600-1-.12 of the Contested Case Procedures of the State Board of Equalization provides that the appeal be filed with the Executive Secretary of the State Board and that the appeal "identify the allegedly erroneous finding(s) of fact and/or conclusion(s) of law in the initial order"; or

- 2. A party may petition for reconsideration of this decision and order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-317 within fifteen (15) days of the entry of the order. The petition for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking administrative or judicial review; or
- 3. A party may petition for a stay of effectiveness of this decision and order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-316 within seven (7) days of the entry of the order.

This order does not become final until an official certificate is issued by the Assessment Appeals Commission. Official certificates are normally issued seventy-five (75) days after the entry of the initial decision and order if no party has appealed.

ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2006.

MARK J. MINSKY

ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES DIVISION

c: Mr. Roy E. Williams, Sr. Vernon Long, Assessor of Property